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4	List of Symbols
a Output elasticity of public infrastructure and private capital ratio
b Output elasticity of effective educated labor
g Degree of congestion of students
e Congestion parameter, knowledge acquired previously by students
h  Elasticity of education at the balanced growth path with respect to the
fraction of tax revenue spending in education
Sq Fraction of population in school (students)
Tq Fraction of population working as teachers
k Educated labor elasticity of effective teaching capacity
L Admission policy variable ratio
m Educated labor elasticity of government spending on education
p Constant fraction of school equipment
r Discount rate
V Educated labor elasticity of the education quality
t Final output tax rate
f  Congestion parameter, ratio of having a high proportion of students
compared to the proportion of teachers
w Extent of externalities of the public infrastructure services
W Balanced – growth path
a Admission policy constant ratio
C Consumption
E Stock of educated labor
·
E Flow of educated labor
EG Government spending on education
5IG Public infrastructure services
hG Government spending on each service (education or infrastructure)
K Aggregate stock of private capital
·
K Accumulation of capital
L Number of students
·
L Flow of the number of students
iN Number of workers
Q Quality factor
r Rate of return to capital
Ev Fraction of tax revenue spending in education
Iv Fraction of tax revenue spending in infrastructure
hv  Fraction of tax revenue spending on each service (education or
infrastructure)
Tw Wage of the teachers
pw Wage rate in the private sector
Y Aggregate output of the firms
61. Introduction
The impact of education on growth has been a subject of much attention in recent
academic research and debates. The implications of human capital accumulation have
been stressed as a determinant of growth in per capita income in several works since the
seminal contribution of Lucas (1988). Many researchers have considered schooling
variables such as enrolment ratios and average years of attainment as a measure in
previous works. However, they only measure the quantity of schooling and not the
quality. Many people might believe that one year of education in the country side of a
developing country is not the same as in the capital city of a developed country.
Therefore, considering the quantity of schooling as a measure will not give an adequate
comparison between countries.
Although the quality of schooling is not the same among countries and even within, it
takes little analysis to see that education levels differ dramatically between developing
and developed countries. The possibility to quantify education quality in several ways
makes it usable for comparisons and analysis, Barro and Lee (2001) discuss the
available cross-country aggregate measures of the quality of education. Such as pointed
by Hanushek and Wößmann, (2007), ignoring quality differences significantly distorts
the picture about the relationship between education and economic outcomes.1
One indicator of schooling quality is the students’ international test scores. Hanushek
and Kimko (2000) find that test scores are positively related to growth rates of real per
capita GDP in cross-country regressions. Knighton and Bussière (2006) find that higher
scores at age 15 in the PISA examination, lead to significantly higher rates of post-
secondary schooling of Canadian 19 year olds.2 Moreover, Hanushek and Kimko (2000)
find clear evidence that international test performance relates to productivity
differences.3 The combinations of these results indicate that the quality of schooling, in
addition to the quantity is an important ingredient of human capital and economic
performance.
1 (Hanushek and Wößmann, 2007, 2)
2 The OECD tested random samples of 15-year-old students across participating countries under the PISA
program in 2000.
3  (Hanushek and Kimko, 2000,  1204)
7Another indicator of quality of education is from the implications of congestion in
schools. As many researchers have worked in these topics, it is of great importance to
consider their results for the measurement of quality.
One of the most common congestion cost is teacher-student ratio in schools. A teacher-
student ratio is expected to be negatively correlated with test scores because students
can learn more rapidly by having more frequent interactions with teachers in smaller
classes (Barro and Lee, 2001, 468). Angrist and Lavy (1999) also confirm class size
effects by identifying significant differences in test scores between Israeli students who
were subject to different class sizes by the exogenously given Maimonides’ rule.4 In
spite of, Hoxby (1998), who using an instrumental variables approach based on natural
population variations in Connecticut, found no significant effects of class size on
performance. Nonetheless, it is commonly agreed that overcrowded classrooms affect
the education in quantity and quality in schools.
Another congestion cost is infrastructure related, which has been studied in different
works in the endogenous growth literature. Eicher and Turnovsky (2000) consider that
the use of public capital is congested by the use of private capital. On a different
approach, Albala-Bertrand and Mamatzakis (2004) found that in Chile, there is a
positive effect of the public infrastructure on the private investment and therefore on
growth. Brenneman and Kerf (2002) consider a positive impact of infrastructure
services on educational attainment. A better transportation system, safer road network,
greater access to safe water and sanitation, electricity are some of the impacts they
consider can help to raise school attendance, study time and improve the learning
process.  Heynemen and Loxley (1983) show that school resources have much stronger
effects on achievement in developing countries than in develop ones: in a sample of 29
countries.5 Hence, consider infrastructure as a congestion cost is important for the
purpose of this work.
4 According to Maimonides’ rule, a maximum of 40 students is allowed to enroll in a class. Therefore,
when enrolment exceeds 40, an average class size drops sharply. Maimonides’ rule can thus cause
exogenous variations in class size.
5 (Heynemen and Loxley, 1983, 1185)
8These previous considerations and the importance of education quality for economic
outcomes, turns the study to important policy issues.6 As Agénor (2009) mention, the
production of human capital requires not only government spending on education
services but infrastructure capital as well.7 Therefore, the government faces a decision
problem since the determination of the optimal expenditure ratios is marked by the
fiscal structure, which represents a critical issue. Is it reasonable to believe that
spending a higher amount in education services will increase the economic growth? Or
is it better to spend more in infrastructure? Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) mentioned
that the evidence that the returns to education have implications for both economic
policy and economic theory, in the private returns to education is on the order of 6-10
percent.8 Hence, if education represents an important component of the economic theory
and likewise quality is relevant in education, it is essential to study some of its
implications.
These thesis focuses on the quality of education as all of the previously mentioned
studies suggest; quality may have a greater impact than the years of schooling on
economic growth.  The endogenous growth model used for this thesis is taken from
Agénor (2012), which originally was based on the Uzawa (1968) and Lucas (1988)
model. The basic structure is extended in many ways, at first by a former paper from
Agénor (2008), which considers that the endowed raw labor must be educated instead of
a simply stock of human capital. Based on Hanushek and Kimko (2000), the labor force
quality has a consistent, stable, and strong relationship with economic growth9 and
knowledge is thus embodied in educated workers. The main reason for this modification
is that as quality is relevant for growth, the raw labor will exist even if no quality in
education is present in the schooling process. Hence, this model takes into account that
quality creates educated labor force, which is the main driver of the economy.
A second incorporation of the model in Agénor (2008) is a consequence of the previous
consideration. As the creation of human capital requires being educated, that implies
that workers must go through the education system. Therefore, the education technology
6 (Hanushek and Wößmann, 2007, 3)
7 (Agénor, 2009, 126)
8 (Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001, 22)
9 (Hanushek and Kimko, 2000, 1203)
9includes the number of students in it, contrasting with the basic model in Agénor (2012)
that does not have it. Derived from this condition, it must be present an admission
policy imposed by the government, which is also added to the basic model. The
admission policy is considered being constant as most countries have, but further in the
thesis, it is variable consequently from increasing the years of mandatory schooling.
These modifications change the conditions of a stock of human capital into a flow of
educated labor in the economy.
One essential difference in Agénor’s (2012) model is regarding the interpretation of the
congestion costs and the presence of them. He considers both congestions cost relevant
but only applying one at a time in any economy (mostly developing countries), I
compare them as a close representation of developed and developing countries. While
the developed countries have infrastructure services well provided, the developing
countries do not and face the same conditions adding the infrastructure congestion cost
to the schooling congestion. The main purpose of Agénor (2012) is to obtain the optimal
spending share allocations; this thesis compares the optimal levels and the effects on the
growth with each approach in addition to the former’s objective.
Finally, a new congestion parameter is introduced to the model which is not considered
in any of the based references. This is defined as the past knowledge that the students
have in average within a class and that teachers require to enhance the learning process.
This knowledge is acquired from the previous teachers, students, exams and education
quality in general, denoting students who attended an education of good quality will
possess more knowledge than the ones who did not. This parameter represents a value
easy to obtain which may measure quality, since it can be taken as an approximation
from the international test scores. The consideration of this parameter enables to
compare the quality of education between countries in the same conditions.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter two presents the basic
framework, in which the production, household preferences, human capital and
government conditions are given in detail. The third chapter discusses the balanced-
growth equilibrium and the dynamic properties of the model. Chapter four studies the
dynamics of the balanced growth path by considering an increase in the schooling
congestion. The following chapter examines the implications of a revenue-neutral shift
10
in spending in education, whereas section six provides the optimal values of a growth-
maximizing spending allocation of public expenditure between education and
infrastructure.  Chapter seven presents a brief analysis of the implication of the new
parameter added to the model. Chapter eight presents a modification to the model when
the government increases the mandatory years of education and the implications in the
growth path and in the government spending share allocation. The final part of the
thesis summarizes the main results, discusses the implications of the analysis and offers
some suggestions for further research.
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2. The	Basic	Framework	
Consider an economy populated by a single, infinitely-lived household and a continuum
of identical firms, which are normalized to unity for simplicity ( )1,0Îi . The economy
includes a productive sector, preferences of the household, government that provides
services such as infrastructure and education. Production sector requires the use of
human and physical capital and also public infrastructure services. The services that are
required by each firm consist of roads, electricity, communication services, sewers, and
water systems among others. The household consumes only one single good, which can
be traded or used in consumption or investment. The government is responsible for
providing public services to population free of charge, such as school equipment, school
supplies, sanitation services, electricity, and so on. The school equipment consists of
computers, microscopes, laboratories, screen projectors, tables, chairs while the school
supplies considers books, pencils, pens and teacher´s material.
The population as the firms is of a constant size and is normalized to unity for
simplicity. Schooling is mandatory in the economy but just in primary and secondary
school, so higher education is not included in the category. However education can be
received at any moment in time at a constant fraction of ( )1,0ÎSq , which represents the
populations of students. The rest of the population is divided by a constant fraction of
teachers ( )1,0ÎTq , who are paid by the government, and laborers paid by the private
sector ( )1,0)1( Î-- TS qq  . These two educations’ sectors have a wage arbitrage
condition that determines the allocation of each one among the non-studying population.
Human capital accumulation is described as the educated labor that possesses enough
knowledge for basic work or study in the next level. Besides this condition the human
capital accumulation depends on the proportion of students and teachers, government
expenditure and a quality indicator that is responsible for the knowledge acquired by
students. For simplicity students and workers are considered as full time in their own
activity, so there is no possibility of being a student and a laborer (teacher or private
worker) at the same time.
The economy has some congestion costs which can be understand as the limitations or
negative effects in the use of a public good or service. Public infrastructure faces a sort
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of congestion when one firm partially excludes another firm from the use of it making it
partially rival. There is also congestion in schools, which affects negatively the quality
of the educated labor created in the education system. With these conditions both public
infrastructure and education are non-excludable and partially rival.
2.1 Production
The output of each representative firm, iY , in the economy is produced with public
infrastructure services, iG , and the two basic inputs, human and private physical capital,
iK . The public infrastructure is affected by the congestion in proportion to the stock of
private capital K . Moreover, the physical capital is referred as effective labor that can
be obtained when multiplying the number of workers, iN , in each firm by the stock of
educated labor, E , in the economy. The production function exhibits a constant return
to scale in some of the firm inputs, in this case effective labor and private capital
bb
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-÷
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öç
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æ= 1)( iiIi KENK
GY (1)
where )1,0(, Îba  and diKK i
1
0ò=  represents the aggregate stock of private capital,
considering that all firms are equal in the economy. Because all the firms have access to
the same stock of educated labor and public infrastructure they are all affected in the
same way. As mentioned before there is congestion related with the use of public
infrastructure which is measured by the aggregate capital stock.
Assuming that the markets are competitive, the public infrastructure and the aggregate
stock of private capital are given to all the firms, each firm has the objective of
maximize its own profit. As a result of the firms maximization, they have to pay the
private inputs at their marginal rate, ENYw iip /b= , and ii KYr /)1( b-= , where, pw
represents the wage rate in the private sector and r  the rate of return to capital.
Noting that all the firms and population in the economy are equal and normalize to
unity, the aggregate stock of capital can be considered as KKdiKi ==ò10 i" .  In  a
similar way the number of laborers can be aggregated into a common variable, N ,
resulting as the remaining proportion of the population which is not studying and
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neither working as teacher, in the form )1(10 TSi NdiN qq --==ò . Considering these
previous modifications the profit maximization conditions result
E
Yw
TS
p )1( qqb --= , K
Yr )1( b-= .       (2)
Given these conditions now the aggregated effective labor is ETS )1( qq --  which
requires that the proportion of students and teachers do not represent the whole
population. Therefore the following condition has to be established in order to avoid a
corner solution with no workers in the economy:
Assumption 1. 1<+ TS qq .
Finally the aggregate output will have an AK technology with respect on the proportion
of workers, the congestion in the public infrastructure, KE / and private capital stock.
This result if the first three elements mentioned before are constant in the following
equation
K
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2.2 Household Preferences
The representative infinite-lived household faces a future utility maximization problem
based only in the consumption C  and the discount rate 0>r . Consumption is
considered in a logarithmic form, in which case the income and substitution effects
cancel out, and also that the household’s propensity to save or invest are independent of
the rate of return on capital as in Agénor (2012). For this model leisure is not included
so the household do not faces a negative utility between the decisions of being
productive or working and spending time in leisure. Another specification is that the
utility does not include any positive effect with the acquisition of education. Therefore
the discounted stream of future utility is given by
dttCV
c
)exp(lnmax
0
r-= ò¥ .     (4)
The household budget constraint will consist of the spending in consumption and the
accumulation of capital that for simplicity does not depreciate over the time. Because as
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mentioned before free education is provided by the government equal to the use of
public infrastructure which has no user fees, the household benefits from an implicit
rent from the public expenditure. The household budget constraint is
EwYKC TTqt +-=+
·
)1(     (5)
where )1,0(Ît is a final output tax rate and Tw  represents the wage of the teachers
which is not taxed to keep an arbitrage condition between the sectors.
To get the flow of consumption over time it is necessary to maximize the household
utility function (4) subject to the budget constraint (5) taking into account the aggregate
output (3) as shown in the Appendix A
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where )1)(1( bat ---ºs and considering the salary, proportion of teachers and
educated labor as given will yield the Euler equation stated above with the transversality
condition 0)exp()/(lim =-¥® tCKt r .
2.3 Human Capital Accumulation
The human capital accumulation will be described as the flow of educated labor,
·
E , in
the economy. Raw labor grows at a constant rate but it must be educated before it can be
used in the production market. As mentioned before, the model analyses the effects of
the congestion costs over the growth rate in the quality variable.
The congestion cost associated with the proportion of students and teachers in a school
is considered as the first approach. The second approach is defined as a particular case
of the first approach. In this case the congestion cost affecting the infrastructure and
materials available to teach are added to the congestion in schools parameter. Moreover,
this work considers a third congestion cost which affects both of the previous, so it can
be integrated in both of the previous. It can be explain as the quality of the education
received by the students that then transforms into knowledge. Therefore, if the quality
of the education is good enough the students will have more knowledge making it easier
for the teachers to give lectures and increase the abilities of the students.
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For the first approach, the production of educated labor requires the combination of a
quality factor Q, the gross proportion of students )1( Sq+ , the effective teaching capacity
ET )1( q+ , the government expenditure in education EG , and the number of students L .
Then the flow of educated labor in the economy will be10
[ ] mkmkV qq --· ++= 1)1()1( LGEQE ETS (7)
where )1,0(ÎV making the quality of education having decreasing marginal returns to
scale and )1,0(, Îmk . Thus, the education technology in this case displays constant
returns to scale with the effective teaching capacity, the government expenditure in
education and the number of students. It is important to indicate that in (7) the effective
teaching capacity is used instead of the number or the proportion of teachers because
this can capture more the essence of the teaching knowledge. As knowledge requires
good conditions, it also depends on the fact that the teachers belong to the educated
labor. As Goldhaber and Brewer (1999) mentioned teachers who are certified in
mathematics, and those with bachelor’s or master’s degree, are identified with high test
scores, so that these variables influence student achievement.11
The same way as in Agénor (2008), it is assumed that L  is large enough at all times to
ensure that the flow of educated laborers is not greater than the number of students,
resulting in the following condition
LE£
·
. (8)
Additionally, the quality term has an inverse relationship with the degree of congestion
in the education system, affecting directly the capability of the economy to increase the
flow of educated labor. In this case the quality term is measured as a rate of the gross
proportion of teachers divided by the gross proportion of students, as follows:
f
e
q
q
)1(
)1(
S
TQ
+
+= (9)
10 The use of the gross proportion of teachers Tf+1  and students Sf+1  ensures that even with Tf  and
Sf close to zero, the growth will still be positive
11 (Goldhaber and Brewer, 1999, 520)
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where, e and 0>f  represents the congestion parameters. The first one represents the
past knowledge acquired by students while the second term shows the ratio of having a
high proportion of students compared to the proportion of teachers. Hence, the quality
will depend on the proportion of students relative to the proportion of teachers, abating
or increasing the flow of educated labor. Additionally, the gross proportion of teachers
having the other congestion parameter can be explained as, if in average the students
have the basic knowledge needed to be in that level, then the teacher can focus in
teaching the topics established without the need of reviewing basic subjects before or
delaying the class in explaining to the students who do not know it.  As depreciation of
knowledge is not considered and every student possesses a small amount of basic
knowledge the parameter must satisfy the following condition:
10 £< e            (10)
where having 1=e will represent that in average all the students have the basic
knowledge require by the teacher to be effective. Therefore, the quality of the education
will be present in all levels of the schooling making it a congestion cost additional to the
first parameter. As the impact of the first congestion cost is measured byf ; the only
possible way that there will be a proportional congestion can be obtained if 1== fe . In
this case the quality can be explained purely as the ratio of the proportion of students
and the proportion of teachers or in other words the class size. As Tamura (2001), and
so many literature considered a common indicator of efficiency in the education
systems, where class sizes determinate the quality of the education.
Combining the previous definition of quality (9) with the flow of educated labor (7)
yields, and after rearranging,
L
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For this first estimation, the model considers as in Agénor (2008) that the admission
policy for students remains equal, trying to keep the student-teacher ratio as a constant
from previous periods. Hence, the number of students has to be divided by the effective
teaching capacity, such as,
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where 0>a  for obvious reasons. For this condition to be satisfied, requires that once
located in the balanced growth path where the educated labor grows at a constant rate,
the number of students must grow at the same level. Furthermore, to ensure this will
imply that the population in the economy, considering total raw population, must grow
at the same level of the educated labor in the steady state. In optimal conditions this will
mean that all the population is accepted and therefore transformed into educated labor.
However, the persons who are not accepted in the education system or drop it will then
turn into a non-market activity which is not consider in this model.
Using the government admission policy (11), is possible to rewrite the latest flow of
educated labor (12) as
m
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thus, (13) represents the growth rate of the stock of educated labor which depends on
the constant rate of admission policy, the proportion of teachers, the proportion of
students and the public spending on education.  As exhibit in the equation, there is still
an assumption to be made to avoid getting a negative growth rate in the gross share of
students. If the congestion f  is too high and the parameter V  close to 1 or large enough
also, then the net effect of the growth rate might be negative. This will mean that
students are not productive in this education technology, which cannot give any logical
result in the analysis. Therefore, the following assumption is established:
Assumption 2. 01 >- fV .
This assumption ensures that the gross proportion of students can be productive in the
model. The proportion of teachers, )1( Tq+ , do not require any special assumption
because for all cases 01 >-+ meV making both, teachers and students, productive in the
growth rate of the educated labor.
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As mentioned before, the model considers another congestion cost where public
infrastructure, school supplies and equipment may affect the education technology. This
will also change the ability of the economy to produce educated labor. The explanation
of this idea is that as far as the knowledge is obtained by the students, the requirements
of better technology or infrastructure are needed. This will make the productivity of the
teachers greater than without it. If the government spends enough money in providing
good infrastructure and equipment then the teacher will face fewer constraints in their
lectures and the quality of the education will increase. Hence, if these conditions are
optimal the students must have enough knowledge and the teacher can be productive.
As identified by Glewwe and Kremer (2006), the lack of adequate school equipment in
schools has an important role in improving or constraining the education quality.
To capture this consideration in the model, the human capital accumulation equation
must include the impact of infrastructure services, IG , in the student population, L .
This will represent a special case of (7) since the first approach considers this impact
equal to 1.  As mentioned before, these services are partially rival, so their use decreases
with an increase in the flow of the number of students
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where 0³g  measures the degree of congestion of students and 0>w  measures the
extent of externalities of the public infrastructure services. To understand better the
idea, if too many students require the computers at the same time the use of the
equipment will be limited and this will reduce the public service usefulness. Another
example can be referred as too many students using the internet services will slow the
access of the remaining students making it more difficult to use all its advantages. Even
in poor conditions if students do not have individual tables or chairs, they will distract
themselves by sharing any of these.  The equation (14) exhibits constant returns to scale
in government spending in education, effective teaching capacity, infrastructure services
and the number of students. It is possible to notice that equation (7) can be obtained if
0=w . This is equivalently as considering that equation (7) fits more into a developed
country environment, when infrastructure services are well provided within the
population. Then equation (14) represents more developing countries conditions.
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For this case, the quality term also changes to capture the idea so now the school
equipment represents a constant fraction )1,0(Îp  of the total spending on education
which is divided by the effective teaching capacity. Moreover, the proportion of
teachers faces also the constraint of the knowledge that the students have 10 £< e  with
the same congestion cost 0>f  as before. The quality indicator will be defined as
[ ]feq
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Substituting (15) in (14) and after rearranging yields,
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and considering (8) is possible to take into account that
··
=LE . If this holds, then the
growth of students must be equal the growth of educated labor at the steady state. Thus,
combining this condition and using the same admission policy (12) into (16), after some
manipulations equation (16) will be replace by
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This equation, represents the growth rate of the stock of educated labor with the new
conditions. It also needs the following assumptions to be imposed in order to avoid
adverse effects:
Assumption 3. 01 >--- efVwm .
This assumption is in order to make the teachers productive, contrary as in the first
approach now the proportion of teachers are facing a constraint in there growth. Hence,
to avoid getting a negative effect from the productivity of the teachers Assumption 3 has
to be considered.
Assumption 4. 0)1( =-- gwfV
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Equivalently to (8) this assumption ensures that the stock of educated labor grows at a
constant rate in the steady state. This condition will imply that ( ) gfVw /1 -= , so that
10 << f  to keep the value of 0>w . This shows that there is a negative relationship
between these two parameters. Intuitively this condition says that the stronger of the
congestion cost existing in the stock of educated labor on the production of knowledge,
the less effect of the infrastructure services to generate a higher growth at the steady
state, also adjusted by the congestion in the flow of the number of students. Different
from the first approach, it was possible to get a proportional congestion between f  and
e , in this case it can only happen if 1¹= ef .
2.4 Government
The government as stated before is responsible for providing public infrastructure and
education services. Additionally, the government has to pay the teacher´s salaries, Tw ,
to the proportion of the educated population who works in the schooling system.
Assuming that the government cannot issue debt and must maintain a balanced budget
from collecting a proportional tax rate )1,0(Ît on the market output, the government
budget constraint is given by12
YGGEw IETT tq =++ .          (18)
The entire population can decide either to work in the private market or in the education
system as teachers. Card and Krueger (1992) mentioned that a teacher’s salary and
education level would be indicators of a teacher’s quality. Higher salaries attract more
qualified and productive teachers who can contribute more effectively to students’
achievement. Therefore, it has to exist an arbitrage condition which allow them to work
either in one of the sectors without any disadvantage or disutility associated, resulting
as,
pT ww )1( t-=                    (19)
which implies that the teacher´s salaries absent of taxation must be equal to the taxed
wage of the private workers. Government expenditure on infrastructure and education
services represent a fraction of the tax revenue
12 Substituting (5) in (18) is possible to get the standard GDP identity in the form YGKC E =++
·
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YvG hh t=       (20)
where )1,0(Îhv  and IEh ,= . As derived in Appendix A, using the government
expenditure on each service (20) and combining the wage rate in private market (2) into
the arbitrage condition (19) to then put both into the government budget constraint (18)
will result to the equilibrium proportion of teachers in the model, as:
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which exhibits dependency on the expenditure terms of the government as from the
fraction of students. This brings a logical interpretation as considering 1<+ IE vv
because otherwise the government must issue debt to pay  the teacher salaries and that
case is not consider in the model. Moreover it keeps considering Assumption 1 to hold
1<Sq  guaranteeing that there exist a fraction of teachers in the economy. Hence, the
next proposition is established:
Proposition 1. A reallocation of the expenditure of the government spending between
public infrastructure and education has no implications in the proportions of teachers,
as long as it is a revenue neutral reallocation ( )0=+ IE dvdv .
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3. The Balanced – Growth Path
The full derivation of the balanced-growth path (BGP) for this approach is shown in the
Appendix B. Thus, the BGP can be defined as a set of conditions { }¥=0, tec  such that the
dynamic equations in (6), (B14), (13) with the transversality condition
0)exp(lim 1 =--¥® tct r  are satisfied. Also, it is required that the stock of educated labor,
consumption and physical capital grow at the same constant rate as
KKEECC ///
···
===W . Hence, the transversality condition is satisfied locally because
consumption, educated labor and the stock of private capital grow at the same constant
rate implying that KCc /=  and KEe /= . Therefore, the rate of growth of output can
be shown into a system of two non-linear equations which characterize the equilibrium
in the model as,
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)1/()1( ambac ---º
and (~) represents the steady state value in that variable.  As can be seen the proportion
of workers among the schooling system or the private market affects the growth rate in
the model as located in B and D. Moreover, the parameter,e , affects also the growth
rate of the model in the first approach.
For the ongoing analysis of the BGP, the system is linearized and the following chapters
it is shown the dynamics after some manipulations to the model. Each of the approaches
will be considered in the analysis to illustrate how each of them reacts. For this purpose
a phase diagram is used where the phase line CC  from equation (22) represents the
combination of c and e when the consumption and the stock of physical capital ratio
are constant at 0=
·
c .
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The phase line EE  from equation (23) represents the combination of c and e when the
stock of educated labor and the stock of physical capital ratio are constant at 0=
·
e  for
the BGP of the first approach. The saddlepath has a positive slope that is denoted by SS
and this phase line requires that the slope of EE  must be steeper than CC at the point
where they intersect, as in Figure 1.
The BGP for the second approach considers also equations (6), (B14), (17), and the
same transversality condition as before. In order to get a steady state with a stable
equilibrium is also necessary to take into account Assumption 4. Then after some
manipulations it is possible to rewrite the stock of educated labor in (17) to the
following equation:
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where
( ) ( )fVgefVmVfVgkm qqp -------- ++º 1)1(1)1( )1)(1( TSaJ
Fig 1. The steady-growth equilibrium with the student-teacher congestion cost
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( )fVgVm -++=G 1)( .
This equation boils down to a geometric transformation including new variables such as
the admission policy rate value, the fraction of spending in public infrastructure and the
congestion in public infrastructure, compared to the previous approach. Thus, solving
for the BGP with this second approach (see the Appendix C), the steady state is given
again by (22) and instead of (23),
rt a
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where
( ) ( )fVgVm -++= 1JBM .
Again the allocation of workers between the sectors affects the growth rate. In this case
the variable J  contains the gross proportion of teachers with different conditions than
before so the impact of each will vary.
The same methodology as before will be used. This implies that the phase line CC
from equation (22) as previously represents the combination of c  and e  when the
consumption and the stock of physical capital ratio are constant at 0=
·
c . However,
because the schooling quality is defined differently, the curve EE  obtained from
equation (25) will now represent the combination of c  and e  when the stock of
educated labor and the stock of physical capital ratio are constant at 0=
·
e .
In this case, equation (25) is a non-linear equation which is represented in Figure 2 as
the curve EE . If comparing the BGP of both approaches, it can be seen that even when
the initial point of EE is the same, the steady state value is lower in Figure 2. This
comes from the non-linear behavior of the curve EE  and intuitively because this
approach has more variables involved for the growth in the economy.
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Fig 2. The steady-growth equilibrium with the impact of infrastructure.
26
4. Increase in Schooling Congestion
Once derived the BGP of the model with each of the channels of congestion, it is
possible to make some modifications. Therefore, consider that each approach face a
permanent increase in the schooling congestion, which can be acquired by an increase in
parameter f  or by an increase in the share proportion of students Sq . Intuitively this can
be explained as an increase in the number of students or by a reduction of the proportion
of teachers compared to the students.
Consider the first approach, Figure 3, and starting from the initial BGP denoted at point
A , if the congestion parameter,f , increases then the composite variable D  will be
reduced and hence y (see Appendix E) . This will be represented as a leftward shift of
EE  to a new 'EE  curve. Thus, this will also reduce the consumption and physical
capital stock ratio in the steady state c~ , denoted by the point 'A ,and then slowly go
back to the point where the curves intersect again in ''A . In this case an increase in the
parameter f  does not affect the curve CC , since the congestion parameter is not
present in the consumption function,  so the movement is just represented in the curve
EE . As a final result, there is a lower consumption-physical capital ratio and also a
lower stock of educated labor-physical capital ratio than in the initial conditions.
Fig 3. Increase in the schooling congestion by an increase in parameter f
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For the second approach as equation (25) is non-linear, the transitional dynamics will be
the same but with slightly different conditions as the specifications are different. It is
possible to see that even if the initial point of the curve EE  is the same in both cases,
the first approach will have higher values of the stock of educated labor and physical
capital stock ratio, e~ , and the consumption and physical capital stock ratio c~  in the
steady state. Moreover, the shift of curve EE  of the second approach is not as large as
it is in the first approach.
The previous result comes from the presence of the congestion parameter in equation
(25) which affects almost all other variables in it. Hence, having an increase in
congestion parameter, f , derives a positive shift in some variables given the conditions
of it,  while in most of the other variables it has a negative effect. The total effect is a
leftward movement of the curve EE , which reduce the consumption and physical
capital stock ratio, c~ , and the stock of educated labor and physical capital stock ratio,
e~  in a smaller quantity than in the first approach result. Figure 4 shows the behavior
of the model with this condition.
In case where the increase of congestion is caused by a higher proportion of students Sq ,
both curves will move to lower values but in different magnitudes than in the previous
Fig 4. Increase in the schooling congestion by an increase in parameter f
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case. Because CC  contains B  which includes the proportion of students, Sq , the
impact of an increase will make the curve move down wards to the level of 'CC . While
EE  contains D  and B , both of them containing Sq , the first variable will increase
while the second will be reduce but given diminishing returns then the reduction effect
hampers the new equilibrium point at ''A . Contrasting the previous analysis, this
modification will shift curve EE  to 'EE  less than before as a shared participation of
variable Sq  in equation (23).
In the case of the second approach the leftward shift of curve EE to 'EE  is increased
by the diminishing returns of the composite variable M  included in equation (25).13
First a reduction in the consumption and physical capital stock ratio, c~ , from point A
to 'A  which keeps the same flow of educated labor initially. Later the saddlepath moves
the stock of educated labor and physical capital stock ratio, e~ , to a new value.
Thus, the total effect will set the new equilibrium point at ''A  to lower values of  the
consumption and physical capital stock ratio, '~c , and the stock of educated labor and
physical capital stock ratio, '~e , as illustrated in Figure 6.
13 See Appendix E
Fig 5. Increase in the schooling congestion by an increase in variable Sq
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Fig 6. Increase in the schooling congestion by an increase in variable Sq
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5. Reallocation of Spending to Education	
As in the previous analysis, in this case the phase diagrams have the same notation. The
BGP system will be evaluated when there is a reallocation of the spending and this
gives more weight to the spending on education.  As the reallocation is revenue-neutral
the total government expenditure remains the same, just the parameters of their own
share change their value.
Consider that the first approach faces this reallocation of spending to education, on one
hand this will make the curve CC  to move down wards to 'CC .  On the other hand the
curve EE  will have an ambiguous shift. It can shifts to the right or to the left. It
depends now in how productive the infrastructure services are in the production of
goods, but also how much they influence the generation of educated labor in the
economy. This ambiguity leads to a general optimal spending allocation which will be
covered in the next chapter with more detail.
The first case (right shift) is presented when the increase of the educated workers are
used in the private market leading to a higher production.  This results because with a
higher rate of educated labor able to work in the production of goods, gives a larger
productivity even with less infrastructure that may still lead to an increase in the stock
of educated labor and physical capital stock ratio to '~e  and also to a bigger
consumption and physical capital stock ratio to '~c , as illustrated in Figure 7.
Fig 7. Budget-neutral increase in the share of public spending on education
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The second case (left shift) occurs when the supply of infrastructure is reduced affecting
the educated labor also. As mentioned before infrastructure services affect the
generation of educated labor and it tends to lower it by diminishing the supply of these
services. Therefore, changes in production affect both of the variables of consumption
and the educated labor, so the steady state will depend on the technology parameters. So
in the case of a larger a , it is expected that the educated labor and physical capital
stock ratio e~  and the growth rate will decrease as shown in point '''A .
Regarding about the second approach case, the effects on the steady-state are the same
as explained before, just adapted to the properties it has. Nonetheless, the impact on a
reallocation share of spending will be larger in this case than in the first one at both
scenarios (positive and negative). The fact that the BGP now includes the direct
parameter w  related to infrastructure services in the education technology, which for
simplicity is modified into other parameters, gives a straight reaction in the model.
It is not entirely surprising that in all the modifications and even in the initial BGP, the
second approach has lower values. The explanation can be given because the model is
more affected to the share of spending and the congestion parameters affect in a greater
amount the model.
Fig 8. Budget-neutral increase in the share of public spending on education
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6. Growth-Maximizing Spending Allocation
For the purpose at hand, one of the important concepts to illustrate is the effect of
schooling quality. Therefore, showing the optimal spending allocation between
education and infrastructure services within the presence of the congestions costs
represents a key issue in this work.  Given the conditions of the model, it is only
possible to examine the growth maximizing spending allocation solution using
Proposition 1 ( )0=+ IE dvdv . This means that under a revenue-neutral reallocation of
government spending the model will keep a constant proportion of teachers. This
represents a convenient assumption because with that is possible to get a feasible
analytical solution.  Moreover, considering that government spending must hold the
following inequality 1<+ IE vv , the growth maximizing share of spending on education
can be obtained for both approaches (Appendix D).
Recalling that both congestions costs approaches have equation (22) in their BGP, it is
necessary to obtain the impact of an increase in Ev on the growth rate. This result will
lead to
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which represents the elasticity of the educated labor and private capital ratio at the
steady state with respect to the fraction of tax revenue spending in education.  It is
possible to interpret this elasticity as it is the proportion of the parameter a and b
multiply by the proportion of the tax revenue spending in education and infrastructure.
Regarding the first approach conditions, equation (23) is used as it represents the second
equation in the BGP system. Hereby, the previous considerations from Proposition 1
become useful as the composite variables B  and D  can be considered as given
(Appendix E). It can be established that the growth-maximizing share of spending on
education is,
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From equation (27) is viable to interpret that although the degree of congestion in
schooling affects the economic growth in the long term; it is not included in the optimal
spending allocation between education and infrastructure services. The properties of this
explanation can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. The growth-maximizing spending allocation in education is increasing in
b and decreasing ina , however, it is not affected by the degree of congestion in
schooling nor any other parameter described in the schooling technology.
Consider now the second approach conditions, with equation (25) in addition with the
results previously taken, it can be established that the growth-maximizing share of
spending on education is given now by
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The previous equation, considers as before that the proportion of teachers does not
change and under revenue neutral reallocation equation (27) is a specific case of (28).
This particular case is when the congestion parameters, 1== fg  and the spending
component 1=+ Vm . The properties of equation (28) can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 3. The growth-maximizing spending allocation in education with the
congestions costs affecting the infrastructure and teaching capacity, depends positively
on the proportion of schooling technology with respect to parameter, m ,which is the
component of spending and negatively on the parameter,f .
This can be explained as a situation when the degree of the congestion parameters in
schooling is high, the optimal share of spending in education services will be reduced.
The reason for this is that the negative effects of the large congestion on the flow of
educated labor that will affect the final outcome can be compensated by increasing the
spending share on infrastructure services.
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This kind of reallocation of spending will benefit first the production in the economy
and then the education technology to diminish the congestion costs. For example, if
government increase the number of schools or classrooms, then the congestion
parameter, f  , will be reduce on the optimal spending allocation on education.
However, these considerations will require some modifications such as increasing the
number of teachers, so that the student-teacher ratio remains constant. Some of these
considerations will be discussed later.
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7. Impact of Parameter ε
In sight of this work it is important to evaluate the model and the impact of the new
additional congestion parameter, e . Recalling that this parameter is a measure of the
knowledge that the students have in average from the previous years with respect to the
required by teachers. This parameter is added to the Agénor’s (2012) model by affecting
the gross proportion of teachers as an exponent. In the former paper this parameter is
not present but it can be considered to have a value of 1 keeping constant returns of the
teaching skills. With that consideration this parameter must have a positive value
because no depreciation of knowledge is considered in the model. This assumption
comes from the fact that even in cases where students cannot fail any school year as in
Finland (Sahlberg 2007, 155) or even if they fail they will have a minimum amount of
knowledge in the average from the spillovers or help from other students, which will be
higher than nothing denoted as e<0 .
Other consideration that must be clarified in the explanation of parameter e , as
depreciation of knowledge is not consider in the model, and knowledge itself does not
possess a limit, a value where 1>e  is also feasible. In spite of this possibility,
considering such case will bring an exponential growth to the model. The fact that this
value is greater than unity will describe increasing returns to scale from the knowledge
of the teaching capacity, which in fact will be counterfactual at some point and lead to
an unstable model.
Empirically, this will represent a special case where the students possess more
knowledge than the expected from teachers bringing the possibility of getting extra
knowledge in that schooling period. Moreover, besides the good effects that this might
bring, it implies two fails in the education system. It represents a fail in the current
education programs as the level of required knowledge is exceeded which means is not
optimal.  It also represents a fail in the future education system given that at a certain
point all additional knowledge will be increasing the required knowledge for the
following years, creating a lower value of e  for the upcoming generations. Therefore,
this possibility is not considered in this paper given that the model is based in a
homogenized population of students and no special education is considered.
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For the present work the values of the parameter are continuous, included from 10 £< e
.  The situation when 1=e  will represent the condition when students have enough
knowledge so the teaching capacities of the instructors will not be affected.
Nonetheless, is difficult to reach this level because it requires two conditions. The first
one is that the collective knowledge of the students must be similar, meaning a small
difference in the knowledge acquired previously between them. The second is that the
lack of abilities and education from the students below the optimal level must be
compensated by a higher knowledge from other students above this level. This effect
can bring good effects as spillovers of knowledge from some students to the others
reducing the gap between the less educated and the good educated students. However,
this condition might also bring bad effects as free riding behavior increasing the gap
between these two groups of students. For the purpose of this work analyzing the value
of each group type is not in the scoop so just denoting these effects will give an idea of
the potential outcomes.
As parameter ε, affects only the teaching capacities, it does not have any effect on the
BGP equation (22) which explains the consumption behavior in the economy. It only
affects the equation regarding of the stock of educated labor. Consider the case when
1=e into the BGP equation (23) of the first approach, so that it becomes
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and represents the new BGP equation of the system given the optimal level of
knowledge from students. From (29) is possible to verify that given the optimal
conditions for teachers the parameters involved in their teaching capabilities are the
marginal returns to quality,V , and the elasticity characterizing the government spending
in education m .  In this case the congestion parameter will enhance the teaching
conditions but the government spending in education elasticity will be negatively
related to it. As long as the marginal returns to quality are equal or greater than the
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elasticity of government spending in education, mV ³ , the teaching capacities will have
constant or increasing returns given this conditions.
Consider now the second approach case with parameter 1=e  into the BGP equation
(25), yields
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which represents the new BGP equation of the system given the optimal level of
knowledge from students. From equation (30) gross proportion of teachers are
negatively affected by the elasticity of government spending in educationm  with the
congestion parameter g , and the combination of the marginal returns to quality V  with
the congestion parameters f  and g . Given that this model consider all the congestion
costs at the same time as the ratio of student-teacher with the infrastructure services
available, it is logical to see that all of them are involved in the BGP equation for
educated labor.  To ensure that the teachers remain productive in this particular case it is
necessary the following assumption:
Assumption 5. Vfggm ))1(1()1( -->- .
The lower limit 0»e  represents the situation when students in average do not have any
of the required knowledge. As this condition is very difficult to hold given the
admission policy restriction the results do not give a clear result in this environment.
Moreover, modifying the admission policy will bring a logical interpretation to these
results as explained in the next chapter. Hence verifying the effect on the BGP when
0»e is important to evaluate the impact of this parameter in the growth of this model.
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Consider the first approach where the proportion of students and teachers in a school
define the congestion cost and using equation (23) with the previous consideration,
gives
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where the new BGP has a different value affecting the gross proportion of teachers.
From the previous equation (31) is possible to see that now the teachers are negatively
related by the elasticity characterizing the government spending in education m .
Compare to (29) where the marginal returns to quality was positively related in this
case; as the required knowledge is not as needed, the quality has no impact.
To evaluate the modifications of the BGP in the second approach, using equation (25)
with the same value of 0»e , so that
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becomes now in the new BGP equation. It can be seen from the previous equation that if
the required knowledge of the students is not as required, the gross proportion of
teachers will be related to the elasticity of government spending in education, m
affected by the congestion parameter, g ,  and the marginal returns to quality, V , by the
impact of the congestion effect, f .
Using Assumption 4 is possible to see that wmfVgm --=--- 1)1()1( , which can be
explain as the infrastructure externalities and elasticity of the government spending in
education are the only parameters affecting the productivity of the teachers in this case.
With these considerations the marginal returns to quality does not affect the
effectiveness of the teachers implying the same condition as with the first approach.
This comes from the fact that given the average knowledge of the students is non
existing the teacher, has to teach from the basics. The quality parameter is excluded
since teaching will start creating the value of the quality parameterV . Lower conditions
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will require more effort to the teachers regardless of how good or bad their abilities are.
At this case there is no possibility of having increasing returns to quality since the
knowledge of the students does not allow that.
These final results contrast with the basic model from Agénor (2008). With the results
obtained with the parameter e  inclusion and the flow of educated labor condition
instead of stock of human capital, the model keeps the parameters m  and w  in the
BGP equation for each approach.
Hence, combining the two limits of the parameter e , is possible to conclude that the
lower the average knowledge acquired from previous years the more affected the
teaching capacities will be by the elasticity of government spending in education m  and
the extend of externalities from infrastructure w . Additionally, the higher the value of
the parameter e the more importance of the marginal returns to quality from parameter
V .
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8. Increasing Years of Mandatory Schooling
So far the model considered in this work is based on the assumption of an admission
policy such that it keeps the student-teacher ratio constant. This condition, in most of
the cases is appropriate for developing than industrial countries. Industrial economies
consider more an admission policy based on the education spending per student as
Agénor and Neanidis (2006) use. However, if this model is based on the characteristics
of developing countries it would be important to consider some modifications regarding
the admission policy.
On one hand if more students are able to study and transform into educated labor, the
benefits will be higher than with a constant number of students. On the other hand
modifying the admission policy allowing more students to get into a higher education
level is feasible but will affect the quality of the education itself. Reducing the
requirements in the admission test will implicitly describe that the education system is
facing a problem, as no students have the necessary abilities or the lack of interest in
certain topics.
Education is a public service provided by government but it is not equal between
countries. Besides the quality, infrastructure and materials, also the years of mandatory
years of school vary among each country. While most of the developed countries have a
bigger number of mandatory years of schooling than developing countries, increasing
the years of mandatory schooling will not give the same results. As for instance in
Eckstein and Zilcha (1994) a small level of compulsory education gives a higher level
of output, capital and human capital in an economy. Moreover, compulsory education
also represents a public policy that enhances the growth and makes the distribution of
income more equal among the individuals. Thus, the population in an educated
economy is better off in the long run if they have a high level of education, obtained
mostly from public education. It is natural to believe that a productive development
strategy would be to raise the schooling levels of population.14
14 Hanushek E. A. and Wößmann, L (2007, 3)
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Taking into account the previous statements, increasing the years of mandatory
education is supposed to bring additional growth to a country. Adding some extra years
to the education system brings some changes to the growth rate stability. Consider the
case when the government increases the years of mandatory school. Given that the
government has a limited number of facilities and infrastructure, this modification will
imply that the admission policy has to change. In other words there was a filter of
students trying to keep a student teacher ratio constant, but now this will have to be
modified to accept the gross number of students in the next years of education.
The admission policy besides keeping a student-teacher ratio constant also keeps an
optimal level of knowledge among the students, accepting the ones more competent.
Thus, an additional number of students given the gross proportion of teachers will
change the student-teacher ratio and rise the value of the congestion parameter f  andg .
This will reduce the average knowledge of the students’ parameter, e , and affect usage
of the limited amount of infrastructure provided by the government. Keeping in mind
that the education is provided by government the same as infrastructure, adding new
classrooms to the education system is not as immediate as changing a policy so the
previous effects will take some time to disappear.
In the foregoing analysis, it was assumed that the admission policy was constant as in
equation (12). After the modifications of the admission policy, equation (12) will no
longer have a constant value a  , therefore becoming:
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where 0>L  and will no longer be constant as long as the infrastructure facilities are
optimal for the gross population of students at the extra years of education. This new
equation will have implications likewise in the quality of education. The previous
constant student-teacher ratio a  from (12) will be taken as a threshold to determine if
the quality of the schooling technology is ‘high’ or ‘low’, such as
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where Q  again is defined as either  (9) or (15) with the modification that the marginal
return to quality will show if it has a ‘high’ or ‘low’ value compared to the threshold
value a .
The model with this specification can generate multiple BGPs, depending on the value
of the new admission’s policy of the student-teacher ratio L  and the type of quality
definition (first or second approach). Deriving a full characterization of these new
outcomes is not considered in this word, however they will give similar results as the
already given with some differences. Furthermore, the two general cases of
H
V  or
L
V
will have different growth-maximizing share allocations between the education and
infrastructure services.  In the case where
H
V the optimal share *Ev  will be higher than
in the
L
V situation. Nevertheless, in the
L
V -regime the optimal *Ev  will be lower as the
optimal *Iv  will increase its value.  These results can be summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 4.  Increasing the years of mandatory schooling raises the government
spending share on public infrastructure at the steady state, in order to reduce the
congestion in schools.
As the model is based on educated labor instead of raw labor, if the years of education
are not enough for achieving the level of new educated labor, the growth will decline. If
the new years of mandatory school increase the number of students given the previous
conditions, the quality of the education will be reduced as the congestion parameters
increase their values. The years needed to reach the level of educated labor will be
higher and the final output will be reduced. Therefore, the government will need to
reduce the student-teacher ratio by building new classrooms and consequently hiring
more teachers. If none of the previous measures are done, a huge difference in the
knowledge between students might happen. Allowing all type of students into a new
education level will induce that in some cases students with not even the minimum
requirements in the same class as the highly skilled students or even a full class of the
same type. Hence this will represent the model behaving as in equations (31) and (32).
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9. Concluding Remarks
This thesis studied the implications of quality as a congestion cost in the education
system for an optimal level creating educated labor that enhance the economic growth.
The analysis in Chapter 3 was based on an endogenous growth model considering free
access to public services as education, which is mandatory until certain level and
infrastructure spillovers. These public services are provided by the government which is
financed by a tax rate on final output. The importance of including infrastructure
services in the model is because students need access to roads, electricity to study (at
night), to use a computer, adequate sanitation and school facilities among many things
which the government must provide. The inputs of the production function include
private capital and labor, which instead of being raw must be educated to become
productive. The quality of education was inversely related to the degree of congestion in
schools, which was denoted in two ways. The first approach considers the proportion of
students and teachers in the population and the second approach as the ratio of the
government spending on education to the effective teaching capacity. An own feature
added to the model was the inclusion of parameter ε. It measures the knowledge that the
students have for the following education level, which affects the teaching capacities if
it is not optimal.
The BGP of the model was derived with the conditions of the saddlepath stability were
examined in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. It was shown that the equilibrium was locally
determined. The models presented a linear behavior and a concave curve shape.
The transitional dynamics associated with an increase in the degree of congestion was
analyzed with the two approaches in Chapter 6. It was shown that given the increase of
the congestion parameter the final output will be reduce in both approaches. The same
negative effect was obtained by increasing the degree of congestion by augmenting the
proportion of students but with higher impact in both models.
The transitional dynamics associated with a revenue-neutral shift in the composition of
public spending from infrastructure services to education were analyzed in Chapter 7.  It
was shown that in general that shift will have an ambiguous effect on the growth rate
and the steady state values of consumption and the supply of educated labor, which are
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measure by the proportion of private capital. Such ambiguity is determined by the
impact of the infrastructure services in the production function. If the impact of is less
than the effective labor then there will exhibit a higher value of growth. In the other
case, the shift will reduce the growth even with more educated labor in the economy as
infrastructure services have a more important role in the production function.
Chapter 8 analyzes the growth-maximizing share allocation in each approach. With the
first approach when the student-teacher ratio define the quality, the growth-maximizing
share of government spending on education services was shown to depend only in
parameters which characterize the production function and no education parameters. In
the second approach the growth-maximizing share was shown to depend negatively on
the congestion parameter and the parameters characterizing the education technology.
Chapter 9 analyzes the impact of the quality education parametere , showing that as the
value of this parameter decreases the teaching capacities will be affected in a larger
proportion by the government spending in education and the extent of the infrastructure
spillovers. Contrasting this case, if the value of parameter e  increases, the importance
of the marginal return to quality parameter V  rises.
The final chapter presents the scenario when a modification in the admission policy is
made by lowering because of an increase in the mandatory years of school. No
characterization was developed but the analysis of the possible outcomes was taken into
account. This change had shown that the modification of the admission policy by
increasing the years of mandatory school raises the growth-maximizing share on public
infrastructure to compensate the reduction in the final output.
Although the model developed used different considerations than the ones initially used
in Agénor (2008) and (2012) it can be extended in a variety of directions. One extension
would be to analyze the impacts of the growth in the economy given a more detailed
description of students. Hence, for this case differentiating the highly skilled from the
less skilled students and the impact they have in the quality of the education system. A
second possibility of extending the model would be to consider private education, in
addition to public education. This would bring a different analysis since the education
system will be one whole but for the students schooling will be presented as a decision
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making between substitutes. Additional assumptions must be included in the model
such as subsidies to private schools to make it feasible to all the population. These
considerations would let the analysis of the growth and distributional effects of each
system as in Glomm and Ravikummar (2003), in the presence of trade-offs between
public education and infrastructure spending. A third extension of the model would be
including the condition where the parameter e  may have values higher than unity. This
would be reasonable if special education in any private or public way is available in the
model. The impact of this special group might be focus on particular sectors of the
growth and this could make possible the consideration of highly educated labor among
the rest of the population, preventing a brain drain in the economy.
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Using the previous equations, the current-value  Hamiltonian for this problem will be:
·
+=H KCU l)(
where l  is a co-state variable corresponding to the state variable
·
K . It can be interpreted as
the shadow value of private capital. It evolves according to:
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Together with the budget constraint, the transversality condition, and combining (A1) and (A2)
will give,
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Estimating the equilibrium proportion of teachers (21)
Combining the wage rate in private market
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Appendix B
This Appendix derives the dynamic form of the model and with it the solution of the
steady state. This part only considers the congestion cost associated with the proportion
of students and teachers in school (first approach).
Dynamic form
Considering that YvG II t=  from (20) and using (3), yields
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Putting (21) into (3)
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which is (22) in the text.
Similarly, noting that YvG EE t=  and using (3) with (21)
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so that,
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where 0)1()1( >---º ambac , giving the same result as  equation (24) from the
text.
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Steady State
For the expressions of the steady state given in the text as (22) and (23) concerning the
first approach and correspond in this Appendix as (B10) and (B14). To determine the
values of the steady state in the system of cande, it is necessary to set 0==
··
ec in (B15)
and (B17).
First from (B15)
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To investigate the dynamics by linearizing the system (B15) and (B17) in the vicinity of
the steady state gives,
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where the ija are given by
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where e~  and c~ denote the stationary values of e  and c . Concurrently in (B22) e  is
predetermined at any given moment in time, whereas c  is a jump variable. For the
saddlepath stability is required one unstable (positive) root, which must come from the
determinant of the Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives of the dynamic system (B22).
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021122211 <-=D aaaa . Hence using the previous definition yields
( ) 0~
1
~~~ 11 <---=D
--- a
b
a
ac ta
bcy evBscec
or equivalently 21221112 // aaaa -<- , that is, the phase line EE  has to be steeper than
the phase line CC .  It can be seen that the slopes of the phase lines are positive and are
given by
( )( ) 0~
1~
~ 1
11
11
12 >---=-=
--- a
b
a
a
tja
b evsB
a
a
ed
cd
CC
( ) 0~
1
~
~
~ 1
11
1
21
22 >-+=-=
-
---- a
b
a
ac tja
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With the above definitions it is possible to verify that the equilibrium is unique in the
system.  Taking into account that from (B21) and the derivative of it gives 0~ <eF , then
it cannot cross the horizontal axis from below because 0>r  for the case when 0)0( >F
. Considering that )~(eF  is a continuous monotonically decreasing function of e~ , only
one unique positive value of e~  can satisfy 0)~( =eF .
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Among the previous linearization, the stable manifold is given by
( )tveeee exp)~(~ -+= , ( )eecc ~~ 1 -+= w
where
0~~
1222
1 >--=
-º
vc
a
e
avw
represents the slope of the saddlepath, denoted as mentioned before as SSand v denotes
the negative root of (26). Noting that 012 <a and 0~ >-vc the value of 1w  will be
positive. To verify if SS is flatter thanCC , it is enough to note that ca ~/121 -<w , as
012 >va .
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Appendix C
This Appendix derives the dynamic form of the model and with it the solution of the
steady state and the stability properties. This part only considers the congestion cost
associated with the infrastructure and materials available to teach and enhance the
abilities of teaching (second approach).
Dynamic form
As for this approach, the model changes only in the flow of educated labor conditions,
which enable the analysis to keep the same equations from Appendix B from (B1) to
(B12). Consider now that schooling quality equation is given by (15) and the flow of
educated labor is (14).  By substituting (B15) into (B14) gives
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Given that from (12),
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followed by some modifications gives
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which is the same as (17) in the text.
Again using (B12) into (C2)
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Consider the restriction from Assumption 4 wgfV =- )1( , this equation is
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
g
fVg
g
fVg
fV
Vm
VmefVg
fVmVg
fVkm
qqp
-+--
-
--
+--------
·
÷÷
÷
ø
ö
çç
ç
è
æ
÷
ø
öç
è
æ÷
ø
öç
è
æ++=
11
1
1
11111
)1)(1( e
K
Ge
K
Ga
E
E IE
TS
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )[ ]
( )fV
fVgVmg
fVVm
fVgefVmVfVgkm qqp
-+
-++-
-+
--------
·
÷÷
÷
ø
ö
çç
ç
è
æ
÷
ø
öç
è
æ÷
ø
öç
è
æ++=
11
1
1)(
1
1)1(1)1( )1)(1( e
K
G
K
Ga
E
E IE
TS
that is (24) in the text,
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with
( ) ( )fVgefVmVfVgkm qqp -------- ++= 1)1(1)1( )1)(1( TSaJ      (C4)
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and
( )fVgVm -++=G 1)( .  (C5)
Using (C5) and putting (B12) and (B2) in it, gives
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where
( ) ( )fVgVm -++= 1JBM . (C7)
Combining (B9) and (C6) yields
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and
( )fVs -+= 11
1
. (C10)
Steady State
For the expressions of the steady state given in the text as (22) and (25) concerning the
second approach and correspond in this Appendix as (B10) and (C6). To determine the
values of the steady state in the system of cande, it is necessary to set 0==
··
ec in (B15)
and (C8).
First from (B15)
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equivalently for (C8)
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Combining (B19) and (B20) through eliminating c~ as
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is possible to get and expression in the form
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To investigate the dynamics in the vicinity of the steady state, the system (B15) and
(C8) can be linearized to give,
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where again the ijb values are given by
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Same as before one unstable positive root is required entailing a negative determinant
from the Jacobian matrix of the dynamic system (C14) as 021122211 <-=D bbbb .  Thus,
this will yield
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Therefore the slope of the phase line CC  will remain positive as before while the
conditions of the new curve EE  will show a concave shape given that
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As before the stable manifold is given by
( )tveeee exp)~(~ -+= , ( )eecc ~~ 2 -+= w
where in this case
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1222
2 >--=
-º
vc
b
e
bvw
represents the slope of the saddlepath SS and v denotes the negative root of (C14).
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Appendix D
This Appendix derives the value of the growth-maximizing spending share on education
for each approach. Consider the first approach, where the school quality is given by
equation (9). Using the BGP equation (22) together with Proposition 1 as ( )IE dvdv -=
the effect of an increase in the government’s spending share on education, Ev on the
growth rate will be given by
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Which then multiplied by Ev yields
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From (D2) it can be taken into account that *Ev is such that the elasticity of e
~  with
respect to Ev is equal to
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Similarly Using the BGP equation (23) together with Proposition 1 as ( )IE dvdv -=  the
effect of an increase in the government’s spending share on education, Ev on the growth
rate yields,
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Same as before (D4) multiplied by Ev will give
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thus, the growth-maximizing spending share must also satisfy
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Using the definition of )1/()1( ambac ---º  as )1/()1(/ abamc ---=  and
(D3), equation (D5) becomes
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noting that -®+ 1IE vv ; and then substituting in the (D6) it is straightforward to see that
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is the same as equation (27) in the text.
Consider now the second approach, where the school quality is given by equation (15).
Using the BGP equation (25) together with Proposition 1 as ( )IE dvdv -=  the effect of
an increase in the government’s spending share on education, Ev on the growth rate will
be given by
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which then multiplied by Ev yields
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thus, the growth-maximizing spending share must also satisfy
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Using the definition of (C5), ( )fVgVm -++=G 1)( , equation (D9) becomes
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Again noting that -®+ 1IE vv ; and then substituting in the (D10) with some
manipulations as shown yields
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This is equation (28) in the text.
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Appendix E
Composite variables
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